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One top vulnerability in today's web applications is request 
forgery, in which an attacker triggers an unintentional request 
from a client browser to a target website and exploits the client's 
privileges on the website. To defend against a general class 
of cross-site and same-site request forgery attacks, we propose 
DeRef, a practical defense mechanism that allows a website to 
apply fine-grained access control on the scopes within which the 
i 
client's authentication credentials can be embedded in requests. 
One key feature of DeRef is to enable privacy-preserving check-
ing, such that the website does not know where the browser ini-
tiates requests, while the browser cannot infer the scopes being 
configured by the website. DeRef achieves this by using two-
phase checking, which leverages hashing and blind signature to 
make a trade-off between performance and privacy protection. 
We implement a proof-of-concept prototype of DeRef on Fire-
Fox and WordPress 2.0. We also evaluate our DeRef prototype 
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Session state management [16] is a critical component in modern 
web applications. It augments stateless HTTP and embeds au-
thentication credentials of web clients into HTTP messages (e.g., 
in the form of cookies or the HTTP authentication header), so 
that a website can identify different clients and deterrnine their 
privileges. However, HTTP session state management is subject 
to various security vulnerabilities [22]. One such vulnerability 
is Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), in which an attacker's 
website triggers a client's browser to send an HTTP request to 
1 
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a target website. If the HTTP .request carries the client's cre-
dentials, then the attacker can perform actions on the website 
using the client's privileges, without the client being notified. 
There are different variants of CSRF, such as Clickjacking [9] 
and Login CSRF [3]. 
There have been extensive studies on how to defend against 
CSRF (e.g., [3, 7, 13, 15, 17, 21]). One approach is Referer 
checking, in which the target website can determine the com-
plete URL from which the request is initiated. However, the 
URL information can reveal the access history of the client [3]. 
A more robust approach is token validation (e.g., see [24]), in 
which the target website embeds secret tokens in HTTP re-
sponses, so that the browser can include those tokens in HTTP 
requests to authorize the request initiations. These tokens are 
inaccessible by third-party websites due to the same origin pol-
icy (SOP) [23]. However, such protection fails if both target and 
malicious websites have the same origin but are o\\Tned by dif-
CI-IAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3 
ferent parties (e.g., http://www . f 00 . eoml - al i eel and http: 
Ilwww. f 00 . eoml -trudy I), as the malicious party can steal the 
tokens from another same-origin website and trigger forged re-
quests. We call this attack the same-site request forgery (SSRr) 
attack. 
To effectively defend against both CSRF and SSRF attacks, 
we consider an approach based on fine-grained access control of 
scopes. A scope defines a con1bination of the protocol, domain, 
and path (see Chapter 3.2). The intuition is that a website 
can configure, in a policy file, the scopes that are legitirnate 
to initiate or receive sensitive requests that contain authenti-
cation credentials. The browser can download the policy file 
from the website to check the validity of each of its initiated re-
quests, and exclude sensitive credentials from any requests that 
are considered to be forged. This fine-grained access control is 
also considered in previous studies (e.g., [7, 21]). However, one 
shortcoming of this approach is that the policy file carries sensi-
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tive scope information in plain format that is accessible by every 
browser to check against its initiated requests. Users can find 
out from the policy file how a website designs its access control 
policy and its trust relationships with other websites. Thus, our 
goal is to allow the browser and the website to exchange ' sen-
sitive scope information while they may not need to fully trust 
each other. 
In this thesis) we propose DeRef) a practical defense mech-
anism against cross-site and same-site request forgery attacks 
using privacy-preserving fine-grn'lned access control. By privacy-
preserving, we mean to not only protect a browser from reveal-
ing the URLs from which it initiates requests, but also protect 
a w~bsite frol~ revealing ho\iV it configures the legitin1ate scopes, 
except for those that have been visited by the browser. The 
main idea of DeRef is to employ two-phase checking. First, the 
website configures (i) the scopes that are permitted to initiate 
sensitive requests and (ii) the scopes on the website that are 
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protected by DeRef. Then the website sends the hash values of 
the scopes to the browser, where the hash values are incomplete 
and reveal only partial scope information. In the first phase, 
the browser checks to see if its initiated requests potentiapy 
fall within the configured scopes, and eliminate those that are 
kno\vn to be not configured by the website. In the second phase, 
the browser sends the blinded scopes of its initiated requests to 
confirm if these scopes actually match the configured scopes. In 
a nutshell, DeRef uses two-phase checking to make a trade-off 
between performance and privacy protection in real deployment. 
To our knowledge, this is the first work that aims to build a prac-
tical system that addresses the defense against request forgery 
attacks, while achieving the privacy-preserving property. 
To show that DeRef can be feasibly deployed in practice, we 
implement a proof-of-concept prototype of DeRef on FireFox [18] 
(as a browser plugin) and WordPress 2.0 [29]. We also address 
how the prototype is deployable in other web applications and 
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how it is backward compatible with the original client/server 
operations without DeRef. We evaluate our DeRef prototype, 
and show that its response time overhead can be reduced to 
within 20% by caching the already checked scopes. 
The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews 
the background on request forgery attacks and their defense 
mechanisms. Chapter 3 presents the design and implementa-
tion details of DeRef. Chapter 4 discusses several deployment 
case studies for DeRef and its security effectiveness. Chapter 5 
evaluates the performance and scalability of DeRef. Finally, 
Chapter 6 concludes. 
o End of chapter. 
Chapter 2 
Background and Related Work 
2.1 Request Forgery Attacks 
A request forgery attack is to trigger a forged HTTP request from 
a victim client browser to a target website without the knowl-
edge of the client. A forged request may carry the client's au-
thentication credentials that an attacker can exploit to perform 
malicious actions on the website using the client's privileges. In 
the following, we describe different variants of request forgery 
attacks. 
Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) [3, 13, 15, 17]. In -
7 
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CSRF, an attacker uses an external website to trigger an HTTP 
request from a client to a target website. Suppose that a client 
currently has an active session with a target website A and then 
visits a malicious website B. The attacker can put a malicious 
URL on website B that triggers the client's browser to send an 
HTTP request to website A using the currently active session. 
Then the credentials associated with website A will be attached 
to the triggered HTTP request, and website A will process the 
request using the client's privileges. 
There are two variants of the CSRF attack, namely Clickjack-
ing [9] and Login CSRF [3]. Clickjacking puts an invisi~le frame 
of a target website on a malicious website. When a client clicks 
on the invisible frame, a forged HTTP request can be triggered 
to the target website without the client being notified. Login 
CSRF is an attack that can be launched even before a session 
starts. It triggers the client's browser to send a request that 
contains the attacker's login credentials to the target \\Tebsite. 
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This allows the attacker to later access the client's information 
such as the client.'s activity history. 
Same Site Request Forgery (SSRF) [20, 21]. Different 
websites Inay have the same origin [23] (i.e., same protocol, 
hostname, and port number), while these websites correspond 
to different owners. For exalnple, Alice (target) and Trudy 
(attacker) may individually own websites on the URLs http: 
//www.foo.com/-alice/ and http://www.foo.com/-trudy/. 
Suppose that a client currently has an active session with Alice's 
website and then visits Trudy's website. In this case, Trudy's 
malicious page can read the content in Alice's website, which 
is permitted under the same-origin policy [23]. This is referred 
to as an SSRF attack. Note that the attack still works even 
though Alice uses token validation [24], which can effectively 
defend against CSRF attacks. 
CHAPTER 2. BACI{GROUND AND RELATED WORK 
2.2 Current Defense Approaches 
10 
There are varIOUS defense approaches against request forgery 
attacks. I\1ost of them target cross-site attacks. We also describe 
the approaches that are based on fine-grained access control, 
such that they can be extended to defend against . SSRF attacks 
as well. 
Header checking. A simple approach is to let the website 
check the Referer header and determine where the request is 
initiated. However, this approach has privacy concerns, as the 
Ref erer header reveals the last visited URL of a client from 
which the request is initiated. To protect a client's privacy, the 
origin header approach [3] introduces the Origin header, which 
is similar to the Referer header except that it only contains 
the origin information with the patl~ details relTIoved. How-
ever , checking only the origin information cannot protect against 
SSRF attacks, in which both target and lTIalicious websites are 
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hosted under the san1e origin but on different paths. 
Tokell validation (e.g., [24]). Token validation is now widely 
deployed to defend against CSRF. The website generates a se-
cret token in a client session, and validates the token when the 
client initiates requests to perform privileged actions. The to-
ken is protected from other websites by the same-origin pol-
ICy. However, token validation is difficult to implement due to 
the possibility of leaking the token value [3]. NoForge [15] is a 
server-side proxy that associates secure tokens with active ses-
sions. However, as addressed in Chapter 2.1, token validation 
cannot defend against SSRF attacks. 
Client-side defense. Unlike the above approaches, some stud-
ies consider client-side approaches that do not require server-side 
participation, thereby making deployment easier. RequestRodeo 
[13] is a client-side proxy that strips credentials from a request 
whose URL has a different origin from the originating webpage. 
Since it is proxy-based, it cannot exarnine HTTPS traffic. BEAP 
CHAPTER 2. BACI{GROUND AND RELATED WORI{ 12 
, 
[17] is implemented as a browser plugin so that it can examine 
HTTP and HTTPS traffic. It focuses on inferring the intentions 
of clients in generating cross-site requests. However, it does not 
address how to defend against SSRF attacks. 
Fine-grained access control. Fine-grained defense approaches 
allow website owners configure the access scopes from which re-
quests can be initiated. SOMA [21] requires a website to set 
up the policy files that specify the external websites with which 
the website can communicate, and requires external websites to 
allow the interactions. The browser can use the policy files to 
enforce protection. Csfire [7] is a browser plugin that parses a 
fine-grained policy file that specifies which third-party sites can 
initiate cross-site requests. Other studies, such as MashupOS 
[10], Subspace [11], and OMash [6], consider n10re fine-grained 
access control for cross-site cOlnmunications in n1ashup appli-
cations. W3C [26] also drafts a specification that states how 
websites can configure the objects that can be shared across ori-
CHf\PTER 2. BACI(GROUND AND RELATED WORI{ 13 
gins. Although the above approaches focus on protecting against 
cross-site attacks, 'we can extend them by configuring the access 
scopes within the same site to defend against SSRF attacks. 
2.3 Lessons Learned 
In this thesis, we consider how to use fine-grained access con-
trol to defend against both CSRF and SSRF attacks . Similar 
to SOMA [21], we allow a website to configure a policy file that 
describes how requests can be initiated and received between 
a browser and the website. Then the browser uses the policy 
file to enforce access control. Although this approach is sound, 
one major concern is that clients can access the policy file and 
easily determine how a website designs its access control policy 
and its trust relationships with other websites. Thus, our goal 
is to design a privacy-preserving approach that can protect the 
policy inforrnation frorn outsiders, while still effectively defend-
ing against both CSRF and SSRF attacks. There are extensive 
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studies on privacy-preserving rpechanisn1s in different aspects, 
such as in data mining (e.g., see [1]) and two-party communica-
tion (e.g., see [4, 19]). To our knowledge, this is the first work 
that aims to design a practical system that defends against re-
quest forgery attacks from a privacy-preserving perspective. 
o End of chapter. 
Chapter 3 
Design of DeRef 
DeRef is designed as a privacy-preserving, fine-grained defense 
mechanism against request forgery attacks. In summary, DeRef 
aims for the following design goals. 
• Detecting forged requests. DeRef seeks to defend against 
general request forgery attacks, including both cross-site 
and same-site (see Chapter 3.1) . 
• Fine-grained access control. DeRef enables a website owner 
to configure the scopes that are under protection, so as to 
eliminate stringent checking on all incoming requests (see 
15 
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Chapter 3.2) . 
16 
• Privacy-preserving checking. DeRef can identify forged re-
quests without requiring both the browser and the website 
to disclose private information to the other side (see Ghap-
ter 3.3) . 
• Feasible deployment. DeRef can be feasibly deployed in 
today's browsers and websites (see Chapters 3.4 and 3.5). 
3.1 Threat Model 
DeRef seeks to defend against the cross-site and same-site re-
quest forgery attacks (i.e., CSRF, Clickjacking, Login CSRF, 
and SSRF) described in Chapter 2. Specifically, DeRef enables 
a browser to identify "forged" requests and strip any authen-
tication credentials from these requests or their corresponding 
responses before relaying them. 
In this thesis, we focus on two types of authentication cre-
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dentials: (i) cookies and (ii) HTTP authentication (i.e., the 
Authorization header). Although authentication credentials 
can also appear in the query strings of GET requests or in 
the data in POST requests, their definitions and formats a,re 
application-specific and it is difficult to distinguish the creden-
tials fronl application data. The identification of application-
specific credentials will be posed as future work. 
To deternline if a request is forged, we need to first determine 
how the request is triggered and where the request is destined 
for. We define the initiating URLs as the set of URLs that can 
directly or indirectly initiate the request. They include (i) the 
Referer URL and (ii) the URLs of the current active iframe's 
ancestors in the iframe hierarchy [3]. Also, we define the target 
URL as the destination URL of the request. Figure 3.1 depicts 
an example of how the initiating URLs and target URLs are 
defined. We allow a website owner to configure a set of target 
URLs on the website that are to be protected, as well as a set 
CHAPTER 3. DESIGN OF DEREF 18 
of initiating URLs that are "approved" to initiate requests that 
carry authentication credentials to the protected target URLs 
(see Chapter 3.2 for details). If a request is sent to a protected 
target URL from any non-approved initiating URL, then we say 
that the request is forged. For example, in Figure 3.1, if the URL 
of the target link is protected, then all three initiating URLs 
(i.e., the URLs of iframe1, iframe2, and the browser tab) must 
be approved by the website in order for a request to be able 
to carry authentication credentials; otherwise, the credentials 
will be removed from the request. Here, we assume that the 
permitted initiating URLs are benign and no request forgery 
attacks are launched from there. 
3.2 Fine-Grained Access Control 
DeRef is built on two access control lists (ACLs), narnely T-
ACL and I-A CL, to enable fine-grained defense against request 
forgery attacks. T-ACL stores the target URLs on the vvebsite 





Figure 3.1: Initiating URLs and target URL. Suppose that the target link 
is clicked. The Referer header will have the URL of iframel. The target 
URL will be the URL of the target link, and there are three initiating URLs, 
including the URLs of iframe1, iframe2, and the browser tab. 
those are to be protected. The stored URLs generally corre-
spond to the sensitive web objects that need to respond to the 
authentication credentials inside the requests, and hence they 
need protection against forged requests. Other non-sensitive 
web objects that are not stored in T-ACL will remain unaf-
fected. Thus, a main purpose of T-ACL is to eliminate stringent 
checking on the non-sensitive web objects. 
I-ACL stores the initiating URLs that are trusted to initi-
ate requests to the target URLs configured in T-ACL. A main 
purpose of I-ACL is to configure the UR,Ls that have different 
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origins while being trusted (i.e., the same origin policy cannot 
be directly applicable). One real-life example would be the web-
sites www. asiarniles. corn and www. cathaypacific. corn. While 
they have different origins, they are lTIutually trusted as they 
deploy the Single Sign-On (SSO) mechanism [25]. Thus, I-ACL 
is used to customize the trusted initiating URLs that may have 
the SalTIe or different origins. If any initiating URL of a request 
is not configured in I-ACL, while the request is destined for the 
target URL that is configured in T-ACL, then the request is 
considered to be forged. 
Scope. Before deploying DeRef, the website on the server side 
first configures the ACLs with a set of scopes. A scope is defined 
based on the same origin policy for cookies [31], and it specifies 
the range of URLs using scheme: / / domain/path, where (i) the 
scheme corresponds to the protocol of the request (e.g., http 
or h t t ps), (ii) the domain includes the domain itself, its su b-
domains, and its underlying hosts, and (iii) the path includes 
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the path itself and its path suffixes. To show how a scope is 
used, let us configure a scope http: / / . f 00 . com/ dir/. Then 
examples of URLs that match our configured scope are http: / / 
www.foo.com/dir / and http://www1 . f 00 . eom/ dir / sub/ .Qn 
the other hand, examples of URLs that do not match our con-
figured scope are http://www . abe . eom/ dir / and http://www . 
f 00 . eom/, since they have a different domain and different path, 
respectively. Note that a scope can be simply an individual 
URL. 
Creating privacy-preserving lists. The website should keep 
the ACLs private to browsers to avoid revealing its defense strat-
egy. Instead, it releases the privacy-preserving lists of scopes de-
rived from the configurations in the ACLs, so that the lists will 
be used in our two-phase checking approach (see Chapter 3.3). 
The lists will be stored in a policy file that is accessible by client 
browsers. 
Publicizing the policy' file. The website owner specifies the -
CHAPTER 3. DESIGN OF DEREF 22 
base URL, which states the exact hostname and path of the 
website under which the policy file will be stored. We assume 
that only the website owner has the write permission to store 
the policy file under the specified base UR,L. The base UR,L 
will be included in a response message to let the browser know 
where to download the policy file. Note that a bro"\vser may 
have downloaded multiple policy files from different websites. To 
choose the policy file for a given request, we use the longest prefix 
match based on the target URL of the request. For example, 
if the target URL is http://www.foo.com/ ... ali ce/login. php 
and there are two policy files with base UR,Ls http://www . foo. 
com/ and http://www.foo.com/ ... alice/ , then according to the 
longest prefix match, the browser chooses the policy file vvith the 
base URL http://www.foo.com/ ... alice/. 
Checking. For each request to be sent to the "\vebsite, the 
browser checks the initiating URLs and the target URL associ-
ated with the request against the scopes configured in the policy 
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file. Since a scope n1ay not state the complete URL , we apply 
incremental checking for each URL. The main idea is to check 
all possible scopes associated with each URL, including all lev-
els of domains starting from the top-level domain, as well ~s 
all levels of paths starting from the root path. To illustrate, 
suppose that we are given a URL http://foo . corn/a/b. html. 
Then there are six possible scopes to check: including (1) http: 
//.com/, (2) http://.com/a/, (3) http://.com/a/b.html, (4) 
http://foo.com/, (5) http://foo.com/a/, and (6) http:// 
foo. corn/a/b. html. We then apply two-phase checking on all 
derived scopes (see Chapter 3.3). 
Caching. If a URL has been checked, then the browser can 
cache the URLs in memory to eliminate checking on the subse-
quent requests for those URLs. We note that using caching can 
significantly irnprove the peri'orrnance, as shown in Chapter 5. 
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3.3 Two-Phase PrivaGy-Preserving Checking 
We now present our two-phase checking approach that acts as a 
building block in DeRef. It allows the browser and the website 
to exchange information in a privacy-preserving manner. It is 
mainly composed of two phases: hash checking and blind check-
zng. 
Before we describe how our two-phase checking works, let us 
assume that the website configures L legitimate scopes in an 
ACL (either T-ACL or I-ACL), denoted by Xi, where i == 1, 2, 
.. " L. Now, if the browser initiates a request to the website 
from URL y, then it checks if y belongs to any of the xi's, so as 
to decide whether the request is within the configul'ed scopes. 
To do this, the browser derives all possible scopes for a given 
URL y (see Chapter 3.2) into Yl, Y2, "', YnL' where m is the 
number of scopes that are derived from y. Then the browser 
checks if any Yj Cj ==1, 2, "', m) equals any Xi (i == 1, 2, 
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L). Our privacy-preserving goals are: (1) the browser does not 
reveal y to the website and (2) the browser does not know the 
X i' S configured by the website, unless a scope of y matches any 
of these. 
Hash checking. In hash checking, the website sends the browser 
a list of k-bit hashes of the configured scopes, i.e., h(s, Xl)' 
h(s, X2), "', h(s, XL)' where h(.) is a function derived by the 
first k bits of some one-way hash function, and s is a random 
salt [28] that is sent alongside the hash list. When the browser 
initiates a request from URL y, it computes h(s, Yj) (j == 1, 2, 
... , m) and checks if it matches any h(s, Xi) (i == 1, 2, ... , m). 
Note that the checking process does not reveal Y to the website 
(i.e., goal (1) is achieved). 
The value of k determines the degree of privacy that the 
website reveals its configured scopes. If k is large (e.g., k == 128 
bits as in MD5) and h(.) is collision resistant, then we claim 
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that it is unlikely for two URLs to have the same hash value1 . 
However, having a large k is susceptible to the dictionary attack. 
For example, after downloading the hash list, an attacker can 
use the popular URLs (e.g., the frequently visited URLs) and 
the salt s as inputs, and see if the resulting hash values equal 
On the other hand, if k is small, then the browser cannot 
surely tell ifaxi is being configured since there are 111any false 
positives that create "noise" to prevent Xi from being fully re-
vealed. For example, if k == 4, then there are 24 == 16 possible 
values of h(.). If h(.) is uniforlnly distributed, then on average 
1/16 of URLs in the entire web can potentially match a h(s, Xi). 
However, we need to eliminate the false positives through blind 
checking (see below) to see if URL y is actually within a config-
ured scope. 
1 As of December 2010, the number of indexed web pages in the web space is about 
22 billion (less than 235 ) [30], which is signifkant.ly less than (,he 1\I1D5 SpRce size. 
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Blin.d ch.eckillg. Blind checking is built on the privacy-preserving 
'matching protocol. -[19], which uses Chaum's RSA-based blind 
signature [5]. We adapt the matching protocol to allow the 
browser to query the website in a privacy-preserving manne~. 
Specifically, we use the potentially matched scopes returned by 
hash checking as inputs, and conduct blind checking as follow: 
• Initialization. The website prepares a RSA public-private 
key pair (e, d) with modulus n. The public key (n, e) will be 
sent to the browser. Also, the website sends the list to the 
browser: H'(Xi' H(s, Xi)d mod n) for i==l, 2, ... , L, where 
H (.) and H' (.) are some one-way hash functions and s is the 
salt value (which is also sent to the browser). We assume 
that H (.) and H' (.) return a long-enough hash (e.g., 128 
bits in MD5) so that it is unlikely for two inputs to return 
the same hash. 
• Step 1. For each scope Yj (for j 1, 2, m) that 
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, 
matches any h( s, Xi) in the first phase , it generates a ran-
dom value rj and sends the blinded hash rjH(s, Yj) mod n 
to the website . 
• Step 2. The website signs and returns rjH(s, Yj)d mod n to 
the browser, which removes rj and retrieves H(s, Yj)d mod 
n. It then computes and checks if H'(Yj, H(s, Yj)d mod n) 
equals any signed hashes H'(Xi' H(s, Xi)d mod n). 
Since the browser sends ,only blinded hashes to the website, it 
does not reveal Y to the website (i.e., goal (1) is achieved). Also, 
an attacker cannot feasibly launch the dictionary attack offiine 
as in hash checking, since it is computationally infeasible to 
generate the signature of the website for a given input Y without 
knowing the website's private key. Although the attacker can 
launch the dictionary attack online by querying the website \vith 
different values of Yj) the attack becon1es more difficult than the 
offline one as it can easily alert the website if the querying rate 
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is too high. By lilniting the query rate of a browser, the privacy 
of the configured xi's of the website is also protected (i.e., goal 
(2) is achieved). 
vVe elnphasize that using blind checking alone can still achieye 
our privacy-preserving goals. A key drawback is that there will 
be significant process overhead. In blind checking, the browser 
needs to take a round trip to send every potentially matched 
scope to the website and have the website sign the scope. Also, 
each signing consists of an expensive asymmetric cryptographic 
computation. Thus, we introduce hash checking to ignore any 
scopes that are guaranteed to be not configured, so as to reduce 
the overhead of blind checking. 
Figure 3.2 summarizes the idea of two-phase checking. 
3.4 Putting It All Together 
DeRef is implemented on both client and server sides to examine 
the communication between the browser and the website. We 
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Figure 3.2: IVlain idea of two-phase checking. 
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now explain the flow of DeRef and how it enforces protection. 
Figure 3.3 shovls the flow of DeRef. 
Start-up. When a user signs in a website, it initiates a login 
request with valid authentication credentials. Then the web-
site replies a login response, in which the server-side DeRef 
includes a new header Protection-Policy, whose syntax is 
Protection-Policy: Last Update Time=[ Time stamp]; Expiry 
Time= [ Time stamp J; Base URL= [ Base URL J. This header 
serves two purposes: to indicate DeRef is inlplelnented in this 
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Figure 3.3: DeRef workflow. 
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website and to state the base URL in which the policy file is 
stored. Also, the header includes the last update time and the 
expiry tin1e of the policy file. If the policy file with the same 
base URL has been downloaded before, while the last update 
tilne remains the same and the expiry time is not yet reached, 
then the client-side DeRef will not download it again. 
Downloading the policy file. If no up-to-date policy file is 
available, then the client-side DeRef dovvnloads the policy file 
as specified in the base UR,L and stores it locally. However, 
an attacker may intercept and n10dify the policy file when it is 
being downloaded, for example, by deleting some of the entries 
in the policy file. To prevent the policy file frorn being rIlodi-
fied, we propose to have it translnitted through HTTPS, which 
authenticates all message transn1issions. Since the policy file is 
downloaded during the login process, we expect that HTTPS 
has been enabled by default. 
Checking Process. The client-side DeRef perforn1s the t\\TO 
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phase checking on the login request that is previously relayed 
before returning the login response to the browser, so as to de-
fend against any possible login CSRF attack. For subsequent re-
quests originated from the browser, the client-side DeRef checks 
the target URLs and the initiating URLs against the policy file. 
It strips any authentication credentials (i.e., cookies and HTTP 
authentication headers) from the requests and the corresponding 
responses if the requests are considered to be forged. 
3.5 Implementation 
We implement a prototype of DeRef to justify its practicality in 
deployment. DeRef is built on the components residing on both 
server and client sides. We now explain in detail the implemen-
tation on both sides, and address the deployment issues if only 
one side enables DeRef. 
Server side implementation. The server-side DeRef is im-
plemented in PHP, and hence is applicable in any PHP-enabled 
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\vebsites. There is a PHP program genPolicy . php, which gen-
erates the policy file with respect to the URLs defined by the 
website owner. Here, we use MD5 for hash operations and 1024-
bit RSA for blind checking. In addition, we use the header func-
tion of PHP to specify a new custom HTTP header Protection-Policy 
to indicate the base URL that specifies the locations of the pol-
icy file. The browser can retrieve the policy file by visiting 
genPolicy . php. In Chapter 4, we explain via examples how 
DeRef can be deployed in various real-life server-side web appli-
cations. 
Client side implementation. We implement a Firefox browser 
plugin compatible with Firefox versions 3 and 4. It retrieves 
the. policy file from the base URL stated by the server-side 
DeRef, and inspects any outgoing requests for any forged re-
quests. Our plugin intercepts requests and responses by listening 
to the events http-on-modify-request and http-on-examine-response , 
respectively, both of which are available in the Firefox in1ple-
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nlentation. Our ilnplementation of the plugin consists of about 
1000 lines of code .. 
Illcremental deployment. DeRef requires the supports of 
both the client and server sides. If only one side has DeRef 
enabled, then our implelnentation is backward compatible with 
the normal operations without DeRef. To elaborate, if the client 
side implementation is absent, then the browser simply ignores 
the custom header Protection-Policy defined by the server 
side and will not download any policy file. On the other hand, 
if the server side implementation is absent, then the browser 
plugin will find that the custon1 header Protection-Policy is 
absent and will simply forward all outgoing requests. 
o End of chapter. 
Chapter 4 
Deployment Case Studies 
DeRef needs both client-side and server-side deployments. On 
the client side, DeRef is deployed as a browser plugin, which 
can be readily included in a browser. On the other hand, the 
deployment on the server side needs n10difications in web ap-
plications. It is irnportant that the rnodifications are rninirnal 
to make DeRef deployable. In this chapter, we show via exan1-
pIes that DeRef can be feasibly deployed in today's ,veb appli-
cations. We explain how to deploy DeRef in -three top open-
source content management systems [27], including WordPress 
36 
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[29], Joomla! [14], and Drupal [8]. 
4.1 WordPress 
'IVe first study the deployn1ent of DeRef on WordPress 2.0. We 
choose WordPress 2.0 as it has a known CSRF vulnerability 
[12], which allows us to test the security effectiveness of DeRef 
in defending against request forgery attacks. Note that we also 
verify that the 1110dification we make in this version is applicable 
to the latest WordPress versions as well. 
Suppose that Alice wants to host WordPress 2.0 on her per-
sonal website http://www.foo.com/ ... alice/. on which she de-
ploys DeRef. First, Alice needs to first configure T-ACL to 
specify the target URLs to be protected. Here, we include three 
scopes in T-ACL for WordPress, including: 
• http://www.foo.com/ ... alice/wp-admin/ • 
• http://www.foo.com/ ... alice/wp-login.php. and 
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• http://www.foo.com/~alice/wp-cornrnents-post.php. 
The folder wp-adrninl contains the webpages that manage all 
WordPress operations, and hence needs to be protected. We 
include wp-login. php so as to defend against the Login CSRF 
attack by restricting all login actions to be initiated from au-
thorized URLs only. We also include wp-comments-post. php, 
which handles the comments posted by visitors. 
Alice also needs to configure the valid initiating URLs in 
I-ACL to specify where the requests can be triggered to the 
protected scopes. Here, we assume that Alice includes http: 
Ilwww.foo.com/~alice/. meaning that all requests must be 
initiated from within Alice's website. 
Both T-ACL and I-ACL are transformed into a privacy-preserving 
policy file (see Chapter 3.2). Alice can store the policy file on 
http://www.foo.com/~alice/ , from which different browsers 
can retrieve. 
In the following, we use WordPress 2.0 as a case study and 
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present how each of the request forgery attacks described In 
Chapter 2.1 is feasible. We then justify why DeRef can defend 
against these attacks. 
CSRF. The CSRF attack is possible in WordPress 2.0 [12], by 
exploiting the vulnerability that WordPress 2.0 does not validate 
the origin of the requests. An attacker can host a malicious web-
page on, say, http://www.attack.com/csrf . html, and trigger 
forged requests to Alice's WordPress. If DeRef is used, then the 
client-side DeRef browser pI ugin will strips all cookies of the re-
quests that are initiated from http://www . attack. corn as it is 
not within the scope of http://www.foo.com/ ... alice/. Thus, 
any forged request will not be processed by WordPress, and the 
CSRF attack is avoided. 
Clickjacking. In the original WordPress 2.0, the Clickjacking 
attack can work as follows. An attacker hosts a malicious web-
page on http://www.attack.com/clickj acking. html, which 
embeds Alice's website http://www.foo.com/ ... alice/ as an in-
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visible fraIne. The malicious webpage clickj acking. html can 
instruct Alice to click on different buttons to trigger forged re-
quests to her WordPress. If DeRef is deployed, then the DeRef 
browser plugin will find that each request contains three ini-
tiating URLs, including the Referer URL, the URL of the 
invisible iframe, and the URL of the browser tab. Both the 
Referer URL and the URL of the invisible iframe are http: 
I Iwww.foo.com/ ... alice/. However, the URL of the browser 
tab is http://www.attack.com/clickj acking. html, ,vhich is 
not configured in I-ACL. Thus, DeRef can defend against Click-
jacking. 
Login CSRF. Login CSRF is possible in the original Word-
Press 2.0. An attacker can host a malicious webpage on http: 
I Iwww.attack.com/logincsrf . html, which triggers a login re-
quest to the login page of Alice's WordPress o.n http://www . 
foo. com/"'alice/wp-login.php. The login request includes 
t he login credentials of the attacker. When Alice visits Word-
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Press afterwards, she would have been signed In as the at-
tacker. If DeRef · is deployed, then before relaying the login 
response back to the browser (see Figure 3.3), the client-side 
DeRef inspects that the target URL of the request is http: (I 
www.foo.com/ ... alice/wp-login . php, while the initiating URL 
is http://www.attack.com/logincsrf . html, which is not de-
fined in I-ACL. Thus, the attacker's login becomes unsuccessful. 
SSRF. The SSRF attack is similar to the CSRF attack, except 
that an attacker hosts a malicious webpage on http://www . foo. 
coml "'trudy I ssrf . html. Although both Alice's website and the 
malicious webpage are hosted on http://www.foo.com/. DeRef 
can still defend against the SSRF attack because the initiating 
URLs are restricted by the policy file but not the same-origin 
policy. Specifically, DeRef can detern1ine that http://www . 
foo. coml "'trudy I ssrf . html is not configured within the scope 
of I-ACL (which includes only http://www.foo.com/ ... alice/). 
Thus, DeRef will strip off any authentication credentials of the 
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requests that are initiated fromhttp://www.foo.com/-trudy I 
ssrf . html. 
4.2 Joomla! and Drupal 
To deploy DeRef in Joomla! and Drupal, we need to address 
SOlne implementation subtleties that (slightly) complicate the 
server-side deployment of DeRef, as explained below. Our dis-
cussion is based on Joomla! 1.6.3 and Drupal 7.0. 
J oomla! The deployrnent of DeRef requires the scope configu-
rations of T-ACL and I-ACL. In particular, T-ACL specifies the 
sensitive web objects being protected (see Chapter 3.2). How-
ever, in Joomla!, the same URL may correspond to either a 
sensitive or an insensitive web object, depending on the query 
strings in the URL. For example, the webpage index. php itself 
simply lists the index page and is considered insensitive. Hovv-
ever , the webpage index. php?task=article. save n1ay corre-
spond to the article editing function and is considered a sensi-
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tive web object. To differentiate between sensitive and insen-
sitive web objects defined by query strings, one can create a 
new sensitive web object (e.g., protected/ art i cle . save. php) 
and redirect the request for index. php?task=article . save to 
protected/article. save. php. Then the URL for protected/ 
article. save. php can be included in T-ACL. 
Drupal. By default, Drupal uses query strings to access web ob-
jects. We use the "Clean URLs" function in Drupal to make all 
web objects accessible without using query strings. For example, 
the administration page is originally accessed by /?q=admin. Af-
ter enabling "Clean URLs" , the relative URL becomes / admin/. 
D End of chapter. 
Chapter 5 
Evaluation 
We now evaluate our implemented DeRef prototype in real net-
work settings. The client-side DeRef is deployed as a plugin 
in Firefox 4.0, where the browser is deployed in a desktop PC 
with CPU 2.4GHz. The server-side DeRef is included in Word-
Press 2.0, with the sarne configurations as stated in Chapter 4.1. 
There are three different entities: a client browser (Firefox), a 
target website (WordPress), and a malicious website. We deploy 
all entities in the same local area network of a uriiversity depart-
ment, so as to minimize the overhead of network transl11ission. 
44 
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This allows us to focus on evaluating the performance overhead 
of DeRef. 
5.1 Performance Overhead of DeRef in Real 
Deployment 
\lYe first evaluate the performance overhead of our DeRef pro-
totype in real deployment using Firefox and WordPress. Our 
goal is to understand the overhead of DeRef in surfing different 
types of webpages. We also evaluate how the use of caching (see 
Chapter 3.2) on the client-side DeRef improves the performance. 
Recall that DeRef uses two-phase checking. Here, we focus 
on the case where there is no false positive returned by hash 
checking by setting a large enough value of k (e.g., using k == 
128 bits as in MD5). In Chapter 5.2, we evaluate how different 
values of k affect the performance. 
We measure the response time, i.e., from the time when the 
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Exp. A.l Exp. A.2 Exp. A.3 
Index Admin Login CSRF Login CSRF 
No DeRef 144.941TIS 165.441TIS 225.821TIS 65.33ms 58.47ms 
DeRef 159.581TIS 494. 771TIS 647.55ms 108.65ms 131.6ms 
(no (10%) (199%) (187%) (66%) (125%) 
cache) 
DeRef 160.761TIS 184.081TIS 261.78ms 77.35ms 70.26ms 
( \vith (11 %) (11%) (16%) (18%) (20%) 
cache) 
Table 5.1: Performance overhead of DeRef in different settings. 
browser sends the first request until it receives all response mes-
sages from the WordPress website. Note that the response time 
also includes the processing time of performing two-phase check-
ing between the browser and the website. The measurements are 
averaged over 100 runs. Table 5.1 summarizes the results of our 
experiments. 
Experiment A.I (Browsing insensitive webpages). \~Te 
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first consider the case where the browser visits an insensitive 
webpage that is not under the protection of DeRef, i.e., the URL 
of the webpage is not configured in T-ACL. Here, we measure 
the response time when we visit the index page index. php on 
WordPress. Since the index page is insensitive, DeRef does not 
need to perform blind checking (provided that no false positive is 
returned in hash checking). Thus, we expect that DeRef incurs 
minimal overhead. Table 5.1 shows that the additional overhead 
of DeRef is around 10%, which conforms to our intuition. Note 
that the performance is similar with or without cache. 
Experiment A.2 (Browsing sensitive webpages). We next 
consider the case when the browser vi~its a sensitive webpage. 
In this case, the DeRef browser plugin will perform both hash 
checking and blind checking, to confirm that the URL of the sen-
sitive webpage is in T-ACL and the initiating URL is in I-ACL. 
Here, we measure the time when the browser visits /wp-login. 
php and /wp-admin/ on WordPress from a legitimate initiating 
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URL. 
Table 5.1 shows that both cases incur significant performance 
overhead, mainly due to the RSA blind signature computation 
in blind checking. If no caching is used, then the overheads are 
199% and 187% for /wp-login.php and /wp-admin/, respec-
tively. Nevertheless, we can mitigate the overhead via caching, 
which stores the UR,Ls that are known to be configured in T-
ACL and I-ACL. When we visit the two webpages again, the 
overheads decrease to 11% and 16% for /wp-login.php and 
/wp-admin/, respectively. 
Experiment A.3 (Browsing malicious webpages). We no"\iV 
consider the case when we visit malicious webpages that trigger 
request forgery attacks to sensitive webpages. Here, we consider 
the CSRF and login CSRF attacks, in which forged requests are 
sent from our malicious website that we set up to the URLs 
/wp-admin/ and /wp-login. php, respectively. Note that in 
both cases , the initiating URLs are not configured in I-ACL, so 
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DeRef only performs two-phase checking to confirm that the tar-
get URLs are configured in T-ACL. Thus, the number of URLs 
to be signed in blind checking is less than Experiment A.2. Over-
all, the additional overheads are 66% and 125% for CSRF and 
Login CSRF, respectively, when caching is disabled, and they 
reduce to 18% and 20%, respectively, when caching is used. 
Compatibility study. Note that DeRef is backward compat-
ible with existing websites that do not deploy DeRef (i.e., no 
server-side deployment of DeRef). To justify this, we enable the 
DeRef browser plugin and have it visit the top 50 websites as 
listed on Alexa [2]. We observe that the DeRef browser plugin 
does not have any incorrect behavior in those visits. 
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5.2 Performance Overhead of DeRef with Var-
ious Configurations 
'Ve now study how various configurations affect the performance 
of DeRef. In particular, we aim to show that DeRef can maintain 
acceptable performance even under complicated settings. 
Experiment B.l (Scalability study of two-phase check-
ing). We evaluate the scalability of DeRef in performing a large 
number of checking steps during two-phase checking (see Chap-
ter 3.2). We note that there are two potential performance 
bottlenecks in two-phase checking. First, we apply incremen-
tal checking for all possible scopes derived from a URL, and its 
performance depends on the number of checked scopes. Second, 
we conduct blind checking for all matched scopes found in hash 
checking, and its performance depends on the number of the 
matched scopes. 
We modify our DeRef browser plugin to generate a randon1 
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nun1ber of scopes and measure the processing times of the two 
potential bottlenecks. Figure 5.1(a) shows the processing time 
of increlnental checking versus the number of checked scopes. 
We observe that the processing time increases with the nu~­
ber of checked scopes, and it is within 35ms when the number 
reaches 100. We expect that this processing time has limited 
ilnpact when compared to the overall performance in DeRef in 
real deployment (see Chapter 5.1), where the response time is 
on the order of lOOms. Figure 5.1(b) shows the processing time 
of blind checking .(i.e., the time from the browser sending the 
blinded hashes for all matched scopes until the website return-
ing the signed hashes) versus the number of matched scopes. 
We observe that the processing time increases linearly with the 
number of matched scopes, and it reaches 3.6 seconds when the 
number of matched scopes is 100. As shown in Chapter 5.1, the 
performance overhead can be significantly reduced by caching 
the already checked URLs. 
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Figure 5.1: Experilnent B.1: Scalability study of two-phase checking. 
52 
Experiment B.2 (Trade-off between performance and 
privacy). R,ecall that the perforlnance-privacy trade-off of two-
phase checking is determined by the value of k (see Chapter 3.3), 
which decides how much information is revealed in hash check-
ing. In this experiment, we evaluate the impact of k. We first 
collect the top 500 \vebsite URLs on Alexa [2]. We then config-
ure .the first l of the 500 URLs in I-ACL, where l == 1, 10, 50, 
100, or 200. The configuration of T-ACL ren1ains the same as in 
Chapter 4.1. We generate 500 requests from our DeRef browser 
plugin to the WordPress website that we set up, such that each 
request has its initiating URL hardcoded to each of the 500 col-
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Figure 5.2: Experilnent B.2: Performance versus k for different numbers of 
URLs configured in I-ACL. 
lected URLs. For different values of k, we measure the process-
ing time for performing two-phase checking (i.e., hash checking, 
followed by blind checking if needed) on each initiating URL 
between the browser plugin and the WordPress website. We do 
not include the time of returning the response from WordPress, 
so the processing time of two-phase checking is less than the 
total response time that we measure in Chapter 5.1. Note that 
when k == 0, we assume that the browser directly conducts blind 
checking. 
Figure 5.2 ( a) shows the SIze of the policy file versus k for 
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different numbers of URLs configured in I-ACL. The size of the 
policy file increases with k and the number of URLs being con-
figured in I-ACL, but the size is within 4.5 KB in all cases. Note 
that the policy file is downloaded once at the start-up phase and 
is cached until it expires (see Chapter 3.4). Thus, we expect that 
the policy file itself introduces n1inimal overhead. 
Figure 5.2(b) shows the processing time of two-phase check-
ing. We observe that when k increases, the time used in two 
phase checking decreases, mainly because hash checking discov-
ers rnost non-configured URLs and skips the second-phase blind 
checking. For example, if I-ACL contains only 10 URLs, then 
the processing time is reduced by 40% from k == 0 to k == 4. 
The trade-off is that more information of the configured scopes 
is revealed with a larger value of k. Another observation is that 
when the nun1ber of configured URLs '(i.e., l) increases, the pro-
cessing time is higher. The reason is that hash checking can only 
fil tcr non-configurcd scopes. If more scopes are configured in an 
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ACL, then 1110re scopes need to be verified by blind checking as 
"vell. 
o End of chapter. 
Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
We present DeRef, a practical privacy-preserving approach to 
defending against cross-site and same-site request forgery at-
tacks. DeRef uses fine-grained access control to allow a web-
site owner to decide how requests should be sent and received 
within protection scopes, so as to prevent forged requests from 
being initiated outside the scopes. We use two-phase check-
ing as a building block that allows the browser and the website 
to exchange configuration inforn1ation in a privacy-preserving 
manner. We implement a proof-of-concept prototype of DeRef, 
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and delTIonstrate that it can successfully defend against request 
forgery attacks in ' real-life applications , while incurring justifi-
able performance overhead. We plan to publicize the source 
code of DeR.ef in the final version of this thesis. 
o End of chapter. 
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